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Abstract 
A theoretical model is developed, which resolves the conflict between observed gaming 
behaviour and Neoclassical rational agent theory. This model provides testable 
hypotheses regarding the participation in various types of gaming activities and the 
welfare effects of taxation on gaming. 
The demographic and socio-economic determinants of demand for gaming in Australia 
are measured using the parametric QUAIDS model. Based on the econometric results, 
the regressivity of gaming taxes is calculated using income elasticities of the budget 
share of gaming expenditures. 
Results obtained provide strong support for the theoretical model, and provide evidence 
to support the position that reliance upon gaming taxation receipts by Australian State 
Governments may lead to an increasingly regressive State based taxation system. 
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Chapter 1 
1.1 Introduction 
1.1.1 Definition of Gambling and Statement of the Problem 
Gambling has been defined as " ... the wager of any type of item or possession of value 
upon a game or event of uncertain outcome in which change, of variable degree, 
determine such outcome1 ". 
Economics has traditionally devoted little attention to issues involving gambling due to 
the difficulty in reconciling the "rational economic agent" and "risk -averse behaviour" 
used in expected utility analysis with the actual practice of gambling. The literature has 
developed in two main directions in order to reconcile observed behaviour with 
economic theory. The participant must either be risk-loving over some section of the 
utility function or attain intrinsic utility from the activity. 
A theoretical model is developed which illustrates that rational economic agents may 
incorporate both gambling and risk-averse behaviour such as insuring, particularly over 
some sections of the associated utility function. This theoretical model allows 
inferences to be drawn with respect to what factors influence people to gamble, and, in 
turn, where the implicit burden of taxation may lie. These inferences are tested 
empirically, leading to the formation of the policy implications of gambling. 
1 Bolen and Boyd, 1968 as cited in Survey of American Gambling Habits, 1977. 
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1.1.2 The Rise of Gambling in Australia 
In 1996 Australia had the second highest per capita expenditure on gambling of any 
nation, behind only the USA 2 This expansion of the domestic gambling industry has 
allowed State governments in Australia to rely relatively more heavily on gambling 
revenue when compared to governments in similar economies.3 The 1997 decision of 
the High Court of Australia to disallow State governments to continue to levy excise 
taxes on petroleum, tobacco and alcohol products implies that this reliance on gambling 
revenue to fill State Treasury coffers will continue to grow. 
The prevwus decade has seen a significant expansion in State supported gambling 
activity in all States, with casinos openmg in Western Australia, South Australia, 
Queensland, New South Wales, the Australian Capital Territory and Victoria, as well the 
continuing expansion ofTasmania's Wrest Point which opened in 1973 and the Northern 
Territory casino. In addition, there has been a notable increase in the number of poker 
machines available. State governments, "sensing this relatively electorally painless way 
of raising revenue"4, have increased collections of gambling-related revenues. An 
example of the effect this has had on State revenues is that in 1996, the $400 billion 
Crown Casino complex in Melbourne delivered $1.2 million daily to the State 
government in gambling revenue alone. Gambling revenue in Victoria in 1995/96 
contributed 12.5% of State own-source revenue, while in Queensland in the same period 
the figure was 14.6%5 
2 Sixty Minutes, 27/09/97. The real net per capita gaming expenditure for Australians in 1995-96 was 
$581.21. 
3 Worthington, 1997. 
4 Kitchen and Powells, 1991. 
5 Worthington, 1997. 
2 
Chapter 1 
The growth of gambling activity in Australia can be illustrated with reference to annual 
aggregate figures published by the Tasmanian Gaming Commission and the Centre for 
Regional Economic Analysis (CREA) at the University of Tasmania. Figure 1 presents a 
State by State comparison of gambling activitl which illustrates the 300.93% increase 
in gambling turnover in the period. 
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In addition it is worth noting that while gaming has remained a popular recreation 
activity in Australia the number of persons participating in gaming activity has fallen 
from 61.15% in 1984-85 to 55.97% in 1993-94.7 This indicates that the increase in 
aggregate gaming turnover results largely from regular participants increasing their 
expenditure on gaming rather than an increase in the number of new participants. 
6 The period 1984-85 to 1993-94 was chosen to coincide with the period of the Household Expenditure 
SutVcy data which will be used for estimation purposes. Figures arc in 1995-96 $A. More detail on this 
is given in Chapter 3 .. 
7 From the HES data. Measured as a percentage of those with some form of gaming expenditure as 
defined in the survey from the sample size. Sec Appendix l for details of participation in gaming. 
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1.2 Rationale for Investigation 
The expanded reliance on gambling revenues by State governments raises questions as 
to the welfare implications of gambling taxes. This leads to two questions for 
economists: firstly, what are the determinants of the demand for gambling, and second, 
what is the incidence of the economic burden of the implicit gambling taxes. As early as 
Pryor (1976), the issue of the regressivity of gambling taxes has been examined. Pryor 
found a significant positive relationship between "classical gambling"8 in various 
societies and the general socio-economic inequality in those societies. 
The majority of gambling-related economic literature has been conducted in the United 
States and Canada, and has focused on the regressivity of racing expenditure and State 
lottery ticket sales. A notable study by Borg, Mason and Shapiro (1991 )9 is the only 
major study to determine demographically the demand for casino games and assess the 
incidence of casino taxes in Las Vegas and Atlantic City. 10 Using a similar approach, 
Scott and Garen (1994) analysed the determinants of demand and incidence of taxation 
for the Kentucky State lottery. 
Reliance on gambling revenue by State governments has been criticised in the United 
States by Madhadhusan11 , Suits12, Calmus13 and Stocker14 amongst others and in Canada 
8 
'Classical gambling' refers to traditional gambling activities such as wagering on horses, card games 
etc. This excludes lotto style gambling and such modern innovations as poker machines. Due to the 
increased accessibilty of gambling products to lower socio-economic groups, such a relationship may be 
negative for some products in Australia. 
9 The Incidence of Taxes on Casino Gambling: Exploiting the Tired and Poor. 
10 Regressivity in Australia may be more pronounced due to lower cost of access to casinos. 
11 Madhadhusan, R., 1996. 
12 Suits, D., 1977. 
13 Calmus, T., 1981. 
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by Henriksson15 . The focus of this criticism has been the influence of other economic 
factors on gambling revenue as well as the potential regressivity of gambling taxes, (see 
Suits 1977). This criticism does not appear to have dissuaded either Australian State 
governments or US and Canadian governments from following the trend 16 of attempting 
to establish a solid revenue base from gambling. 
A point of contention in gambling theory is whether or not the sale of gambling products 
should be considered as implicit taxation, because the purchase of gambling products is 
voluntary. Kitchen and Powells (1991) argue that consumption of such products is "no 
different from the consumption of alcohol, tobacco or any other taxed product. Indeed, 
the implicit [gambling] tax is exactly analogous to an excise tax on any commodity". 17 A 
welfare implication of the consumption of gambling products is that the implicit taxation 
may be fundamentally regressive, "that is, the tax paid by households as a percentage of 
income is higher for low income households than high income households". 18 Kitchen 
and Powells (1991) are supported by Borg, Mason and Shapiro (1993): 
" ... taxes on gambling are taxes even though gambling is a voluntary 
activity. Specifically, they are excise taxes in the same wcry that 
assessments on liquor and cigarettes (two other voluntary purchases) are 
taxes. As a result, it is valid to consider whether the burden imposed by 
taxes on gambling is distributed in an equitable manner." 19 
14 Stocker, F., 1972 
15 Henriksson, L., Hardly a Quick Fix, Canadian Public Policy, 22(2) June 1996, 166-28. 
16 What Madhadhusan and Hcnriksson term "Casino Fever". 
17 Clotfelter and Cook ( 1989), Ch.ll. 
1g Kitchen and Powells (1991), pg 1849. 
19 p 323. 
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This proposition is supported by empirical evidence that gambling is more prevalent in 
lower socio-economic households20, thus making a tax on gambling regressive. 
This evidence is more strongly supportive of the hypothesis that gaming as opposed to 
other forms of gambling21 is regressive: 
"On the basis of the sample who have given themselves access to casino 
gambling, the tax is regressive; in fact it is extremely regressive in Las 
Vegas. Therefore, in this time of easier access to casino gambling, policy-
makers should be aware that the taxes on casino gambling place a 
proportionately heavier burden on low income groups. "22 
The accessibility of gambling facilities is cited in Borg -et al (1993) as a major factor 
influencing the difference in the comparative regressivity of gambling taxes in Las 
Vegas, Nevada and Atlantic City, New Jersey. The results from this study show that the 
incidence of taxation from the relatively more accessible gambling facilities of Atlantic 
City23 is more regressive than the incidence of gambling taxes in Nevada. The 
implication to be drawn from this study is that the implicit tax burden has the potential 
to be more regressive as gambling facilities become more accessible. This is 
particularly relevant in Australia, where the expansion of gambling facilities in all 
major cities has made access to such activities easier than in any comparative economy 
and at any other period. By supporting the expansion of gambling facilities, State 
20 See, for example, Sixty Minutes, 27/09/97 and Bulletin Magazine, 30 July, 1996, and 19 December, 
1995. 
21 Section 1.3 defines this distinction. 
22 Ibid, p 323. 
23 The article cites that at the time of publication twenty-two million people, or 11% of the US 
population lived within a two-hour drive of Atlantic City, whereas most non-resident gamblers fly to 
Las Vegas. 
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governments may be creating a more regressive tax system, particularly with the 
observed increases in gambling turnover in each State. 
The aim of this paper is to extend the content and quality of the available economic 
literature concerning gambling activity in Australian economic research, which at this 
point is currently one study: Worthington 1997. The goal is to identify the determinants 
of demand for gaming in Australia and measure the regressivity of gaming taxes. 
1.3 The Distinction Between Gambling and Gaming 
Gaming expenditure is defined as expenditure on "all legal forms of gambling other than 
racing, such as lotteries, poker and gambling machines, casino gaming, football pools 
and minor gaming (which is the collective name given to raffies, bingo, lucky envelopes 
and the like"24 . Gambling expenditure is defined as expenditure on gaming plus all 
racing expenditure, which "comprises legal betting with bookmakers and totalisators, 
both on and off-course (TAB). It is related to betting on the outcome of horse and 
greyhound races, and, in recent times, on some other specified sporting events, such as 
football matches". 25 
24 Tasmanian Gaming Commission and CREA, Australian Gambling Statistics 1972-73 to 1995-96, 
pg. 2. 
25 Ibid, pg. 3. 
7 
Chapter 1 
In this paper a clear distinction will be made between gambling and gaming, as defined 
by the Australian Bureau of Statistics26, for two reasons. First, there is significant 
anecdotal evidence27 to suggest that racing wagering is more the province of 'high-
rollers'; that is, there is a notable socio-economic difference between participants in 
racing wagering and gaming activity, with the racing industry enjoying support from 
those in a more financially secure position. The second reason is that in all gaming 
activities, the price of the game, the 'takeout', is fixed, as are the associated probabilities 
of a successful outcome for any wager. Racing expenditure is also pari-mutuel in nature, 
meaning that the relative expenditure on each prospect (eg. horse) in each trial (race) 
determines the pay-off for a successful wager. Further the probability of being 
successful on any wager is not constant, but is also a function of human knowledge and 
expertise. That is, knowledge may improve the probability' of success. 
Finally, it is worth noting an empirical justification for this distinction. Racing turnover 
has been virtually static over the past decade 1984-85 to 1993-94, while garnmg 
turnover has increased dramatically, as is illustrated by the tables in Appendix 1. 
The focus of the analysis is on estimation of determinants of gaming expenditure within 
a fully specified demand system. The aim is to identity the significant demographic 
determinants of demand for gaming in Australia and to measure the potential regressivity 
of gaming taxes. 
26 Gaming is defined as "all legal forms of gambling other than racing, such as lotteries, poker and 
gambling machines, casino gaming, football pools and minor gmning (which is the collective name 
given to raffles, bingo, lucky envelopes and the like)". 
27 Sec, for example, Sixty Minutes, 27/09/97 and Bulletin Magazine, 30 July, 1996, and 19 December, 
1995. 
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1.4 Plan of Dissertation 
Chapter 2 presents a revtew of the existing theoretical literature on the utility for 
gambling with an emphasis on the directly conferred utility of gambling, establishing an 
approach whereby the observed behaviour of economic agents who both gamble and 
insure may be studied within the Neoclassical expected utility maximisation framework. 
Chapter 3 discusses the relevant data and estimation issues. Results of the estimation 
process and the measures of the regressivity of gaming taxes are presented in Chapter 4. 
A summary of the results and policy implications of the estimation, and areas for further 
research are presented in Chapter 5. 
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2.1 The Utility of Gambling 
There is a comparatively small amount of economic literature devoted to the analysis of 
gambling, due in part, to the difficulty in reconciling the activity of gambling with 
standard economic analysis. "It is hard to explain why individuals simultaneously pay to 
decrease risk [insurance] and pay to increase risk [gambling]"1. The differing behaviour 
evidenced by economic agents who both gamble and insure is a puzzle for economists 
attempting to explain the incidence of gambling within the neoclassical framework of 
expected utility maximisation of rational agents. The standard methodology is to treat 
gamblers as having the sole motive of improving their wealth position, 2 the intrinsic 
utility to be gained from gambling as a recreation activity "is well recognised, but almost 
always resisted"3. 
Samuelson (1952) commented that "a large fraction of the sociology of gambling and 
risk-taking will never be significantly discernible in terms of money prizes alone, as 
distinct from elements of suspense and gamesmanship"4. This view was again voiced by 
Becker after the 1977 Survey of American Gambling Attitudes and Behaviour " ... the 
activity of gambling rather than the implications for wealth, is the primary motive for 
most forms of gambling; and gambling takes place despite substantially unfair odds"5. 
1 Conlisk (1993). 
2 Since, due to low probabilities of winning, all gamblers will be losers in the long run, this approach 
would seem to be flawed, particularly if the neoclassical assumptions of perfect information and 
rationality apply. 
3 Ibid(l993). 
4 Samuelson 1962 p 677. 
5 Becker (1979). 
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This is especially true for gaming, where in repeated plays, the gambler is certain to lose, 
but less so for wagering, where through the use of knowledge, certain betting techniques 
and human error there is scope to win in the long run. 
It is somewhat surprising to find that in the interim period between Samuelson and the 
present, economics has developed two fundamentally different models to explain 
gambling behaviour, but neither includes any utility of gambling itself. The utility 
functions are defined only in terms of the expected payoffs and the probabilities of 
winning. 
The following sections outline the two traditional models of gambling behaviour, and 
then a new approach which incorporates an intrinsic, or directly conferred, utility of 
gambling as suggested but not incorporated by Becker (1977), Arrow (1974), 
Hirschleifer ( 1966) and Markowitz ( 19 52). The Conlisk ( 1993) model of intrinsic utility 
provides a rationale for risk-averse and risk-loving behaviour to exist simultaneously 
while maintaining the neoclassical expected utility framework. 
This approach is supported by Daniel Suits, a leading US economist in this field, who 
argues in favour of gambling directly conferring utility: 
"Gambler's are perfectly aware that they will lose on the average, but they 
view this expectation of loss as the price paid to engage in the game. For 
most gamblers, in other words, the purpose of gambling is not to get rich, but 
to 'have fun', to experience 'excitement', or to have 'something to look 
forward to ', and they view payment for this recreation in the same light as 
11 
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others look on outlays for theatre tickets, vacation trips, or a night on the 
town." 6 
2.2 Traditional Models of the Utility of Gambling 
2.2.1 The Psychological Model 
The first of the two traditional models is the psychological model, where gambling is 
viewed as an enjoyable pastime, participation in which embues the gambler with 
personal and social gratification like other recreation activities, but the actual 
participation is modelled on the gambler systematically misperceiving the probabilities 
involved in risky prospects? Brunk (1981) cites, amongst others, psychological studies 
by Preston and Booth (1948), Fellner (1965) and Yaaii (1965), and argues that the 
" .. .long history of psychological research investigating individual behaviour under 
conditions of risk [as explained above] should be a generally accepted psychological 
law"8. Weitzman (1965) and Ali (1977) provide empirical support for the contention 
that individuals systematically overestimate beneficial but low probability outcomes 
(winning) and underestimate chance of detrimental outcome (losing) as investigated by 
Brunk (1981). 
6 Suits (1979). 
7 The misperception of the odds is what stimulates the actual participation. According to the theory, 
even though the activity provides utility, rational agents will not participate due to the fact that in the 
long nm gamblers will worsen their wealth position. Only if the probability of success is favourably 
misperceived will a gamble be accepted. 
~ Bmnk (1981) and see for supporting evidence using wagering on horse racing, Ali (1977), Weitzman 
(1965), McGlothin (1956) and Griffith (1949). 
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2.2.2 The Friedman-Savage Model 
The second model is the Friedman-Savage model, named from a seminal 1948 paper, in 
which the authors described a utility function that has a shape allowing both risk-loving 
and risk-averse behaviour. The model uses an expected utility of wealth function with a 
concave central section allowing risk-loving behaviour to be consistent in that area, with 
a standard convex shaped utility function across low and high wealth ranges. The 
concave section of the expected utility of wealth function explains risk-loving behaviour 
such as gambling even when the prospect is unfair, in the sense that the expected payoff 
is less than the wager. Absolute wealth and relative wealth positions form the basis of 
the utility functions in the majority of the economic literature on the utility of gambling. 
Friedman-Savage model is based on a relative wealth structure across individuals, while 
the willingness of each individual to gamble is based on the relative wealth position of 
the individual. 
Participation in the Friedman-Savage model is qualified by what the authors term the 
'disaster zone'. A risky bet will not be accepted if, by losing, the gambler will enter an 
area of their wealth function which leads to disaster; ie. if this leads to a situation where 
financial commitments can no longer be honoured. Kwang's (1965) discontinuous 
utility function assists in explaining theoretically why this may occur.9 For example, if L 
in Figure 2.1 was below the weekly financial commitments of the gambler, then the bet 
would not be taken. 
9 Sec pg. 15 for a further discussion of the Kwang (1965) analysis. 
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This utility function assumes that an individual's expected utility from any given bet is 
the probability ofwinning times the utility of his wealth if he wins, plus the probability of 
losing times the utility of his wealth if he loses. 
Assume initial wealth is Wn. Two bets are examined. The first offers wealth L if the 
bettor loses and G if he wins. The weighted utility of these wealth positions lies on LG, 
at P, given the assumed odds. Since P is below N, the point on the utility function 
corresponding to the initial wealth, the individual will not accept the bet. The second bet 
offers wealth L associated with a loss and wealth G' for a win. The weighted utility of 
this bet, given the assumed odds, lies along LG', at P', which is above N, implying that 
the individual will accept this gamble. 
In general terms, the Friedman-Savage model contends that an individual will choose to 
gamble when the expected utility of income from participating in the (potentially unfair) 
14 
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game is greater than the utility derived from the present wealth level. Formally 
presented, an individual will gamble if and only if: 
E(U) =PU(IJ) + ( 1-P )U(/2); where: U is the utility of income; 
P is probability of a beneficial outcome; 
!1 is income after a favourable outcome; 
and; 12 is income after a negative outcome. 
Brunk ( 1981) provides empirical support for this model. Based on survey answers to 
the question "Are you satisfied with your present income?", results indicate that across 
the seven categories of satisfaction, those that were most dissatisfied spent an average of 
$56.21 more per year on lotteries than the most satisfied. 10 Further work on the 
Friedman-Savage model has been conducted by Markowitz (1952), Kwang (1965), 
Tversky (1967) and Pryor (1976). Markowitz illustrated that the UU' curve in the 
Friedman-Savage model gave a number of paradoxical results, and eliminated these by 
slight adjustments to the UU' curve11 . Kwang (1965) reinstated the traditional 
decreasing marginal utility of wealth assumption by making the function UU' 
discontinuous at the current wealth position. This was justified on the basis that this 
modification by arguing that gambling behaviour is defined by the indivisibility of the 
cost of purchasing a good. 12 Beneficial outcomes allow the bettor an opportunity to 
purchase goods that are otherwise outside the wealth range of the bettor, while a non-
beneficial outcome will not shift the wealth position of the gambler to such an extent 
that the 'disaster zone' phenomena ofthe Friedman-Savage model operates. 
10 This is a close proxy for the Friedman-Savage premise that dissatisfaction with income is the 
motivating factor behind people gaming. 
11 Markowitz (1952) argued that gambling is associated with a utility function derived from changes in 
wealth rather than absolute wealth levels and assumed a special shape for this function. 
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2.3 A Repetitive Gambling Model 
Lee (1969) extended the Markowitz model by incorporating the possibility of repetitive 
playing. Gambling activity is undertaken due to the utility derived from a change in 
wealth, but this is determined by the outcome of previous wagers as well as the present 
result. The importance of this study is that it was the first to formally recognise that 
gaming, such as craps, poker machines, blackjack and keno, is conducive to repetitive 
play. 
The repetitive gambling framework is based on the expected change in wealth per play: 
PI L1 WI + p2 L1 w2 = L1 w; where: PI is probability of winning; 
P2 is probability of losing; 
L1 WI is change in wealth if win; 
L1 w2 is change in wealth if lose; 
From the Friedman-Savage model, an individual will take the prospect13 if the expected 
utility of playing the game is greater than the expected utility if the game is not played, 
ie. the utility of the present wealth level: 
(2.1) 
In a repeated game, the player will therefore take the prospect if his expected utility of 
the change in wealth per play of the game is greater than zero. However, since the 
expected change in wealth is known, should the prospect be taken, the expected utility 
12 For example, an average labourer would not be able to purchase a BMW (or any part of it) unless 
his wealth spectrum changes 
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of the change in wealth associated with playing a repeated game once is dependent upon 
the previous outcome. That is, the gain in wealth L1W1 or the loss L1W2, resulting from 
the previous playing of the game, are directly related to the size of the gain or loss in the 
subsequent outcome of the gamble. The variance of LiW resulting from playing the 
game once is also directly related to the previous outcome, since individuals update 
expected variance by the previous result. 
Allowing x; to be a random variable representing LiW from the first trial; 
Var(XJ = E(X/ - E(X/ For a derivation of the 
variance see Appendix 2. 
(2.2) 
If the game is repeated n times, where each repeat 1s an independent trial with a 
stationary mean and variance, LiW per play becomes: 
1 n 1 2 
var (- Z:x;J = -PrP2 [~fr;- A~] 
n i=l n 
(2.3) 
while the expected change in wealth remains: 
E(X;)= ~W 14 (2.4) 
Substituting these values into the expected utility equation yields: 
This inequality must be satisfied if the prospective gambler is to play the game. 
13 In this chapter the terms "gamble" and "prospect" are used interchangeably. A technical distinction 
may be drawn between the two in that a gamble, by definition, involves a risk, whereas a prospect does 
not necessarily have such a characteristic. Hence a gamble may be called a "risky prospect." 
14 E(_!_ fx;) = _!_nE(X;) = E(x;) = AW 
n i=I n 
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However, this model relies only on P and L1W in order to come to this conclusion. Since 
Lee does not make an attempt to reject the psychological model the misperception of 
odds may therefore influence the number of gamblers who will play the game and the 
number of repetitions each gambler will undertake. 
The criticism of the traditional models of the utility of gambling above and the 
subsequent research is that "Economists have resisted the idea of a utility of gambling15" 
in the sense of an intrinsic utility such as the "suspense and gamesmanship" of 
Samuelson (1952). By developing a model that does allow for a directly conferred 
utility of gambling to exist the apparent contradiction of a rational economic agent both 
insuring and gambling may be explained. 
2.4 An Intrinsic or Directly Conferred Utility of Gambling Approach 
Conlisk (1993) presented the "Tiny Utility of Gambling Model" which reconciles both 
risk-loving behaviour (gambling), and risk-averse behaviour (insuring) as observed to 
exist in rational economic agents. The model uses standard expected utility analysis for 
a risk-averse model but with a tiny utility of gambling term attached, that reflects the 
intrinsic utility to be derived from gambling. This additional term influences choice 
between two risky prospects, a risky prospect and a 'sure thing' and whether to take a 
risky prospect or not. The term influences choice since it adds a positively signed term 
to the usual expected return structure, making it more likely that a prospect will be 
accepted. 
15 Conlisk(l993). 
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The model predicts that a variety of small gambles will be accepted by risk-averse 
economic agents but remains consistent with behaviour observed by individuals facing 
large risks. In contrast to Friedman and Savage (1948), Markowitz (1952), Kahneman 
and Tversky (1979, 1986, 1991) and Machina (1981,1987) the Small Gamble Theorem 
developed by Conlisk allows for simultaneous gambling and insuring for any probability 
of winning and associated gain or loss, that is, for any risk-return structure of a gamble, 
providing an improvement upon the previous models which only allowed such a range of 
behaviour over severely restricted pay-off structures. Conlisk also supports the 
proposition of Markowitz (1952) and Lee (1961) that an individual's objective function 
is concerned with the potential change in wealth rather than absolute wealth positions. 
2.4.1 Definitions 
A fair bet is any gamble for which the expected returnpG + (1-p)L = 0; a risky prospect 
is any gamble where the probability of an unsuccessful outcome, (1-p), is greater than 
zero. That is, there is a positive probability oflosing. 
A fair prospect is any gamble which offers a fair bet structure as outlined above. Note: a 
fair prospect may be risky, although, unlike a gamble, a prospect is not constrained such 
that (1-p) > 0. 
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2.4.2 Fair Bet Structure 
Assume a fair bet where G is the gain from a successful outcome and L is the loss from 
an unsuccessful outcome of a gamble16 : 
:. P(G) = p; and; P(L) (1-p). 
A fair bet for a risky prospect is: pG- (1-p)L = 0 
:.L = pG/(1-p) p = LI(L+G) or p = ll[l+(G/L)} (2.6) 
This can be interpreted as a monotonic function of the gain-loss ratio and is therefore a 
measure of the skewness of the prospect, where G is the size of the prospect and p is the 
skewness. If an individual accepts the fair prospect (G,p) above then the preference 
value becomes an expected utility function modified to allow for the utility of gambling; 
E(G,p,K) = pU[K+G} + (J-p)U[K-pG(J-pf1} + eV(G,p); (2.7) 
where: K is initial wealth; 
U(W) denotes a utility of wealth function which displays 
the following characteristics; 
U(O) = 0; U'(W) > 0, U"(W) < 0; 
and; U(W) < Uw <co; 
Wealth= K +G with probability p; 
= K-L = K-pG(J-p/1 with probability (1-p); 
and; sV(G,p) is the intrinsic utility of gambling17. 
:. A risky prospect (even a fair bet) will be accepted if and only if: 
E(G,p,K) > E(O, O,K) = U(K). (2.8) 
16 For the purpose of the Fair Bet Structure it is irrelevant whether G and L are absolute values (as is 
usually the case with gambles) or arc relative to initial wealth. 
17 Note c is an arbitrary weighting determined solely by individual preferences which scales the 
smallness of the utility derived from gambling but is constrained such that £ > 0. 
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V(G,p) is the utility gained from the excitement and suspense the individual feels in the 
period between the acceptance of the prospect and the resolution of the uncertainty and 
8 is the utility of gambling independent of the potential gain and the probability of a 
successful outcome. Note that this is the utility derived from anticipating a successful 
outcome and associated improvement in the wealth position of the gambler, and is 
dependent on the risk-return structure of the prospect. 8 is determined solely by 
individual tastes and it is the utility obtained directly from participation in the gambling 
activity, and is therefore independent of the expected pay-off. 
Pollatsek and Tversky (1970) derived the standard deviation of a fair prospect, a(G,p), 
as representing the dispersion18 of the prospect. Conlisk (1993) extends this theory using 
the tiny utility of gambling term, sV(G,p), by specifying V(G,p) to be a function of the 
standard deviation: 
V(G,p) 19 = V'[a(G,p)]; (2.9) 
where a(G,p) is a measure of gambling excitement.20 
Therefore, the standard deviation of a prospect may be written as: 
a(G,p) = G[p/(1-p)/·5 ; (2.10) 
and the expected absolute deviation may be written as; 
a(G,p) = pG = GLI(G+L). 21 (2.11) 
18 The dispersion of the prospect is the range of possible retnrns from the gamble around the expected 
pay-off. 
19 For any O<p<l (ie. for a given GIL ratio) it is assumed that V(G,p) as a function of G passes through 
the origin [V(G, 0) = 0}, is increasing in G [VJ(G,p) > OJ and is concave [V11 (G,p) < 0]. If G > 0 then 
V(G,p) increases from zero proportionately with p and :.V(G, 0) = 0 and V2(G, 0) > 0 \7 G > 0. 
20 V'[a(G,p)] is a concave and bounded function which converts the excitement of gambling, in the 
sense of Samuelson's "suspense and gamesmanship' into a utility function. 
21 See Pollatsek and Tversky (1970) for a full derivation of these. Note that G[p/(l-p)f5 and 
GLI(G+L) are constant elasticities of substitution functions of G and L with 17 = 0.5 and 1 respectively. 
This implies that excitement isoquants in (G,L) space should look like standard production function 
isoquants, with a Cobb-Douglas excitement function: 
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This effectively allows Conlisk to avoid the misperception of odds criticism from this 
model; the implication is that the odds are not misperceived, rather, the individual 
receives greater pleasure per unit from anticipating the expected gain, pG, than 
displeasure per unit from anticipating the expected loss, (1-p)L. Therefore utility is 
discontinuous at the initial wealth point for each gamble, as in Kwang (1965). 
Assigning arbitrary weights of (1 +A,) and -1 to the utility of anticipating winning and 
losing respectively yields, where A, > 0: 
(J+J,)pG- (1-p)L = J,pG; where A;pG is net pleasure. 22 (2.12) 
The change from p to (1 + J,)p improves the gamble expectation of a fair prospect from 
zero to J,pG/(1-p), which implies that a(G,p) = pG/(1-p). Since this is not a true belief, 
the distortion of the gain probability will occur only in the V(G,p) component of the tiny 
utility of gambling term in the utility function and not in the expected utility terms. This 
may explain why apparently risk-averse economic agents gamble. 
2.5 The Fair Prospect Model. 
From the utility function defined in the previous section, the Fair Prospect Model (FPM) 
can be derived: 
E(G,p,K) =pU[K+G} + (J-p)UfK-pG(J-pf1} + cV(G,p); (2.13) 
CJ(G,p) = GaL(l-aJ = (GLf 5(G!L/a-o.s) = G[p/(1-p)f!·'l). 
Therefore excitement may be increasing or decreasing in the skewness of the prospect, depending on 
the sign of (a-0.5). Luce (1980, 1981) dicusses four measures of risk. The favoured approach is: 
CJ(G,p) = G0p 0/A +B(l-p/'0/. 
22 Net pleasure from the gamble is greater than 0 because of the greater pleasure the gambler derives 
from anticipating a loss as opposed to the anticipated displeasure of losing. 
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where: L = pG/(1-p) .SK (no negative wealth). 
The functions in U and V are assumed to be differentiable and obey the following 
conditions for any positive K, G and p: 
for p < 1: 0 ~~ U(O) < U(K) < Uw <co; 
U'(K) > 0, U"(K) < 0. 
0 = V(O,p) V(G,O) < V(G,p) < Vw < co; 
VI(G,p) > 0, V11 (G,p) < 0, V2(G,O) > 0. 
Hence, an individual will accept the risky prospect if and only if: 
E(G,p,K) ~ U(K). (2.14) 
2.5.1 Treatment of the 'Tiny Utility of Gambling Term' in the FPM 
There are two approaches to the treatment of the tiny utility of gambling term for any 
particular risky prospect. The first is to assume that the gambling term is present in 
gambles, such as wagering on a card game, but not present in non-gambles, such as 
purchasing insurance. The weakness of this approach is that classification of prospects 
as gambles or non-gambles may be arbitrary. 
The second approach is to assume the gambling term is always present, but its effect 
may be overborne by the risk-averse expected utility terms. 23 Studies provide evidence 
that the size of the prospect determines the level of risk-aversion exhibited by 
23 For example, the gambling utility in terms of excitement and suspense is probably outweighed by 
the risk-aversion pressure from the two expected utility terms for most economic agents, when 
considering whether or not to insure, due to the size of the prospect; ie. G is large. An instance of this 
behaviour observed in practice is some car-owners taking out third party insurance for vehicles of low 
value as opposed to full comprehensive insunmce, which is commonly purchased for expensive cars. 
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individuals24, and the utility of gambling term dominates for relatively small prospects 
(no risk of negative wealth if the outcome is negative) but is overwhelmed by the 
expected utility terms when the stakes are large. The main advantage of this model is 
that the theorems provide testable implications without the need to categorise a prospect 
as either a gamble or non-gamble. 
2.6 The Small Gamble Theorem 
For any fair and risky prospect to be accepted under the FPM, the utility of gambling 
motive must be greater than the risk -aversion motive, otherwise risk -aversion implies 
rejection of any risky prospect.25 Theory therefore requires the weights on the utility of 
gambling term to reach some threshold size26 before any risky prospect would be 
accepted. 
In contrast, the SGT states that any & > 0 will be enough to make some prospects, as 
functions of (G,p) acceptable, dependent on the risk-return structure.27 The justification 
of the SGT and 'tiny' utility of gambling term is that an individual's utility of wealth 
function is approximately linear over a small region. This 'local risk neutrality' makes 
the risk-aversion motive second-order small, whereas the utility of gambling is first-
order small. 28 
24 See Appendix 2 for this evidence. 
25 That is c:V(G,p) > pU[K+G} + (1-p)U[K+G(J-pfj 
26 The threshold size is theoretically be determined by the risk-return stmcture (G,p) of the gamble. 
The size of the gamble, or potential loss, would be the cmcial factor, due to the Friedman-Savage 
'disaster zone'. 
27 E(G,p,K) = pU[K +G] + (1-p)UfK +G(l-pfj + sV(G,p) is always positive under the SGT for small 
prospects. This implies that c:V(G,p) > pU[K+G] + (l-p)U[K+G(l-p)"1] and hence the gamble will be 
accepted. 
28 Sec Appendix 2 for proofs of the Small Gamble Theorem and the associated conditions. 
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Formally, the net benefit, b(G), from accepting a fair but risky prospect may be 
represented as: 
b(G) == E(G,p,K) - U(K); where p is fixed. (2.15) 
=> b(O) = 0; 
=> b '(0) c:VJ(O,p); 
=> b "(0) = p(l-pl U"(K) + sVu(O,p); 
=> b "(G) = pU"(K +G) + p 2(1-pl1 U"[K-pG(l-p/1} + c:Vn(G,p). (2.16) 
All three right hand side terms of b ''(G) are negative and hence b(G) is concave due to 
the concavity of both the utility of wealth function, U(W), and the utility of gambling 
function, V(G,p)?9 
The SGT is concerned only with risky prospects of small size, ie. G is small. As G 
increases, the concavity effect will dominate. From (2.16): 
b "(G)< 0 \fG; (2.17) 
b(G) 
m(K)' 
8large 
8 small 
c(K)' 
G 
29 The SGT rejects the usual association of concavity and risk rejection due to the weight of the utility 
of gambling term, 8, being a first order condition and concavity being a second-order condition. 
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and we expect b(G) to rise into the first quadrant as in Figure 2.2, reach a maximum {at 
m(K)} and then cross into the fourth quadrant {at c(K)}, if E is not too large. The 
subjective weighting E determines the maximum point and the point of intersection 
between b(G) and the horizontal axis. The more utility an individual derives from 
gambling, the higher will be the maximum, and the further along the G axis will the point 
of intersection. 30 This also implies that an individual with a higher subjective weight E 
will accept 'less fair' prospects, ie. a prosp~ct where the probability, p, is smaller for the 
same return, G. 
For values of G greater than c(K) the prospect is unacceptable; to the right of m(K) the 
condition of concavity imposed by the expected utility terms in the FGT begins to 
dominate. This implies consistency between risk-averse behaviour for large prospects 
and gambling. 
2. 7 Extensions of the Small Gamble Theorem. 
2.7.1 Multiple Prospects 
The SGT can be extended to hold for multiple prospects. The individual simply selects 
the option with the largest expected utility, E(G,p,K), or will remain at the status quo, 
U(K). This analysis is valid for repeated gambling behaviour. 
30 Sec Appendix 2 for derivation of m(K) and c(K). 
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2.7.2 Multiple Outcomes 
The SGT also holds for prospects with multiple outcomes such as a fair multiple 
outcome lottery, which can be represented by a vector of pay-offs, and associated 
probabilities: 
X=[X}; 
such that; 
and; P = [pJ; 
IipX = 0; and; E(p,X,K) = EipiU(K+XJ + sV(X,p). (2.18) 
If the ratios among the pay-offs, X, are fixed and the probabilities, pi, are fixed then the 
prospect will be accepted for small X; following the SGT. This equation is outside the 
standard class of expected utility models because it is non-linear in Pi· 31 
2. 7.3 The Lottery Theorem 
Another extension is the Lottery Theorem (L T). A lottery offers a large potential gain, 
G, but since the probability of winning, p, is very small, the expected pay-off, pG, and 
hence the price of a lottery ticket is small relative to other forms of gambling. This 
smallness in the expected return suggests that the SGT applies to lotteries. Therefore, a 
negative shift in the bettor's wealth position will remain within the locally risk -neutral 
section of the individual's utility function. This suggests that the L T is plausible because 
it intuitively follows from the mathematical derivation that there exists a range of p-
values, for which the prospect (G,p) to be accepted. If the individual has a strong taste 
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for skewness, an extreme lottery will not only be preferred to no gamble, but will be 
preferred to other gambles with smaller G-values. 32 
2. 7.4 The Unfair Prospect Model 
Since all games with a set takeout rate are 'unfair' in that the expected return is less than 
the size of the gamble the extension that is the most relevant to gaming, is the Unfair 
Prospect Model (UPM). The UPM is essentially the same as the FPM but the 
acceptance function now becomes: 
E(G,p,K) - U(K) > 0. (2.19) 
As long as the takeout rate is sufficiently small, or the weight a on the gambling term in 
the expected utility function is large enough, the function will hold. Since the size of s is 
determined entirely by individual preferences, there is no extension to the model which 
will be consistent across all individuals, but a simple extension is presented in Appendix 
2. 
2.8 Implications of the Small Gamble Theorem 
By defining two different sources of directly conferred utility from the activity of 
gambling, one dependent upon the risk-return structure and so related to the excitement 
of anticipating a change in wealth, and the second defined solely by individual 
preferences, the SGT remains within standard neoclassical expected utility theory. 
31 Sec Machina (1982, 1987) for a derivation of the condition and an explanation of non-linear 
framework. Machina defines a 'local utility function' whose second derivative defines acceptance or 
rejection. This restores the usual association of concavity and risk rejection. 
32 See Appendix 2 for the proof of the Lottery Theorem. 
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Unlike previous theories, the SGT manages to reconcile the observed occurrence in 
rational economic agents of both risk-averse practices, such as insuring, and risk-loving 
behaviour such as gambling. By allowing the size of the gamble as well as the 
probability of success to influence the utility function V[G,p 1 inferences may be drawn 
as to the characteristics of participants in various gambling activities. 
The implication from the intrinsic utility of gambling function structure is that different 
combinations of p and G, which give the same expected return, will influence the 
subjective utility derived from a gamble, as well as the individual degree of risk-aversion. 
Hence the composition of the risk-return structure will have a causal influence on which 
gamblers play which game, even if the prospective bettor is in the locally risk-neutral 
section of the utility function. If the expected return is held constant, inferentially one 
could expect gamblers with a lower initial wealth position to be attracted to gambles 
composed of smaller probability of success, but which offer large gains. In contrast, 
wealthier gamblers could be expected to participate to a large extent in games which 
offer a higher probability of success, but with smaller gains to be made. 
Intuitively this is logical: more wealthy gamblers would appear to have a relatively 
higher subjective weight, c:, while those with less initial wealth are influenced to gamble 
more by the anticipation of a significant positive shift in their wealth position and hence 
the majority of the intrinsic utility of gambling for these bettor's is derived from the 
VfG,p 1 function. This postulate is the motivation for the empirical aspect of this paper. 
It is an a priori expectation that income will influence the type of gaming activity 
purchased. 
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This implication is supported by the figures in Table 2.1 below, which clearly shows the 
fall in lottery expenditure as income rises suggesting lotteries to be an inferior good. 
Hansen (1995) found a similar result for the Colorado state lottery in the United States. 
Gaming Type 
Gaming as income Lotteries Pokies Casino-type Equivalent income 
share 
Lower Quintile 0.012679 0.001305 0.00367 163.8935 
Second Quintile 0.008224 0.00154 0.002923 316.2901 
Central Quintile 0.006631 0.001288 0.001027 470.2021 
Fourth Quintile 0.004998 0.000953 0.001343 739.9138 
Upper Quintile 0.002489 0.000803 -0.00038 1447.336 
Casino type games and poker machines do not have such a clearly defined income 
pattern, although the general trend for electronic gaming machines is similar to lotteries, 
except for the anomalous second quintile. 
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3.1 Empirical Approaches to Gambling 
The bulk of the existing empirical studies of gambling activity has been concerned with 
greyhound and horse racing. Literature focusing on gaming has generally studied lottery 
sales 1, although Worthington (1997) analyses all forms of legal gambling in Queensland 
and Borg et al ( 1991) study the incidence of casino-related gaming taxes. The approach 
often adopted in modeling the demand for gaming is to estimate either linear2 or log-
linear3 single equation OLS or Tobit demand functions. 4 Single equation models of 
demand are not able to exploit the restrictions economic theory provide5, and in 
particular are unable to investigate the substitution between individual commodity 
demands. This paper is the first in Australia to use a systems approach in order to 
measure these effects in relation to gaming. 
Since the 234.74% growth in real gaming expenditure in Australia over the period 1984-
8 5 to 1993-94 has far outstripped growth in national income, it is important to 
determine which goods consumers are substituting away from in order to inject a higher 
share of their budget into gaming. This approach may also provide some insight into the 
relative regressivity of gaming taxes, by comparing the levels of taxes on the goods 
substituted on which consumers now spend less and gaming taxes. 
1 Eg. Hansen (1995), Scott and Garen (1994), Theil (1991), Kitchen and Powell (1991), Clotfelter and 
Cook (1989), Borg and Mason (1988) and Spiro (1981). 
2 Eg., Hansen (1995). 
3 Borg, Mason and Shapiro (1991). 
4 See Scott and Garen (1994) and Worthington (1997). 
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3.2 Data 
The data used is pooled Household Expenditure Survey (HES) data from 1984 and 
1993. This allows changes in consumption patterns over the period to be analysed. 6 The 
1984 survey consists of 4492 households, while the 1993 survey is based on 8389 
households, in two levels of records. The first level describes demographic, expenditure 
and income information pertaining to each household. The second level details weekly 
expenditure on individual commodities. While the 1993 HES survey offers unit record 
data, household information is used in order to maintain consistency with 1984. The 
reference person for demographic information such as gender, employment status and 
country of birth is the household head. 
The differing methods of categorising demographic variables in the two surveys posed 
some difficulties for consistency, 7 but only marital status and occupation of the 
household head were so cross-categorised as to be unusable. 8 Aggregating categories 
would not have been effective due to the inclusion of similar groups of workers in 
different categories in 1993 when compared with 1984. Gaming data is disaggregated 
into six net expenditure categories in the HES.9 Two categories have been aggregated 
in order to align the HES data with the minor gaming category defined by the Tasmanian 
Gaming Commission and CREA aggregate statistics. The demand system used for 
estimation includes three gaming budget shares as dependent variables. These 
5 These restrictions are: (1) adding up ie. I:wi = 1; (2) homogeneity; (3) symmetry and; (4) negativity. 
These restrictions are further discussed in Chapter 4. 
6 1988 is not used due to the lack of a State identifier. 
7 The definitions of all variables in the demand system are given in Appendix 3. 
8 This is unfortunate since both variables have been identified as significant by Borg et al (1991). 
9 See Appendix 3 for definition of each category of gaming. 
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groupmgs were determined by the risk-return structure of the types of gaming, as 
argued theoretically in Chapter 2 and the six HES categories were aggregated to three in 
line with the risk-return structure argument. The three categories are: (i) ga which 
includes games with a low price, very low probability of winning and a large potential 
gain; (ii) gb which is poker machines, offering an intermediate risk-return structure and 
are arguably the gaming type most suited to repetitive play; and (iii) gc which includes 
casino-type games and such games as keno and bingo which have a higher probability of 
success but with smaller potential gains, for the same price as ga. 
The two main problems presented by the use of gaming data in estimation procedures is 
the presence of negative consumption expenditures (the presence of net winners10) and 
the presence of a large number of zero expenditures. 11 
The large number of zero expenditures suggests that one possible approach is Tobit 
estimation. This process allows the grouping of the sample into non-participants (those 
with zero expenditure) and participants (those with non-zero, usually positive, 
expenditure). This approach assumes all zeros to be non-participants. This is justified in 
part by the extremely small probability of 'breaking even' when gaming, particularly in 
any sample week. Use of Tobit estimation accounts for both the influence of various 
explanatory variables on the decision, firstly, whether or not to purchase gaming 
products, and if the decision is to participate, then secondly, the subsequent decision 
regarding how much to spend. 
10 The three categories had different percentages of net winners: ga = 2.958%, gb = 1.133% and gc = 
1.087<%. 
11 The zeros cannot be distinguished into those that had no expenditure and those that 'broke even'. 
However, it should be noted that the probability of breaking even is very small. 
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Although the likelihood of zero expenditure on gaming indicating breaking even rather 
than non-participation is very small, the lack of an identifier suggests the approach 
followed in this paper, which is to remove the negative values as outliers and treat the 
zeros as actual zero expenditure rather than non-participation. Since participation in 
gaming is defined by a utility function which is in part determined by the anticipated 
utility of success, 12 it is sufficient that participants are aware that some gamblers will 
win, because the stake is placed ex ante rather than ex post. 
3.3 Variables 
A demand system motivated by the theoretical structure developed in Chapter 2 is tested 
using a number of socioeconomic and demographic variab1es that have been identified as 
significant in previous studies, or that the theoretical structure indicates may have a 
significant influence on gaming behaviour. 13 Due to the exploratory nature of this paper, 
there is no unequivocal a priori rationale for predicting the direction and statistical 
significance of many of the regressors. Inclusion of these is justified on the grounds that 
results of the impact of household characteristics on gaming expenditure may be useful 
for policy makers and other interest groups. 
Definitions of all the variables are available from the HES survey material. An 
explanation of how the variables have been structured in order to be used in the 
estimation procedure is contained in Appendix 3. 
12 See Section 2.4.1 for the definition of directly conferred gaming utility. 
13 The influence of demographic variables may impact through the arbitrary s term, the level of risk-
aversion associated with each individual or through the relative income position of the individual or 
household. 
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3.4 The Model 
A parametric demand system for gaming products and other household expenditures is 
developed. Existing studies in applied demand analysis commonly use the PIGLOG 
model or the Almost Ideal Demand System (AIDS) developed by Deaton and 
Muellbauer (1980). These models are rank 2, having budget share equations which are 
linear functions of the logarithm of income. Lewbel (1991) shows that US and UK 
household consumption data appears to be rank 3, meaning linear Engel curves derived 
from the rank 2 models lack sufficient flexibility to model the variety of shapes that 
Engel curves derived from household expenditure data, such as that used in this study, 
may encompass. 14 Banks, Blundell and Lewbel ( 1993) derived a class of quadratic 
logarithmic preferences that provide integrable demand· systems and which are data 
coherent. The rank 3 Quadratic Almost Ideal Demand System (QUAIDS) is a simple 
generalisation of the AIDS model, but which allows the flexibility of non-linear Engel 
curves while retaining integrability. 
3.4.1 Derivation of the Model 
Defining functions a(p), b(p) and A,(p) as specific functional forms of the first derivatives 
of a PIGLOG expenditure function with p being price of the good: 15 
a(p) = a0 +Las logp, + L LYsr logps logp, I 2; (3 .1) 
14 Deaton and Muellbauer (1980) do note that cross-section data often has non-linear Engel curves (at 
pg. 317) but do not develop a rank 3 model in order to take account of this. 
15 The PIGLOG expenditure function is derived from a specific class of preferences which permit exact 
aggregation over consumers such that the representation of market demands is as if they were made by 
a rational representative agent. For a full discussion of this point see Muellbauer (1975, 1976). 
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(3.2) 
log/L(p) = LIL)ogp •. (3.3) 
8 
for some constants ao, as, f3s, Yrs and lvs, \:.1 r and s. 16 
This implies the QUAIDS model has the indirect utility function for a utility maximising 
consumer: 
logl(p, x) = { [ b(p] }-I; where xis total expenditure. (3.4) 
log )la(p) -IL(p) 
By Roy's Identity we can obtain the demand for each good, which take the form of 
quadratic budget shares: 
where: w. = Y.PYx; which is the budget share of goods, wherey is income; and 
b(p)= IlPA. (3.6) 
In order to maintain consistency with economic theory, the parameters should satisfy the 
restrictions for: 
(a) homogeneity: LYsr = 0 \:.1 r; (3.7) 
(b) adding-up: (3.8) 
(c) symmetry: Ysr = Y rs \:.1 r,s. (3.9) 
16 See Lewbel (1995). 
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In practice, the adding-up restrictions are imposed by dropping a budget share equation 
from the demand system when estimating. 
Since prices (the takeout rate) of the gaming products has been approximately constant 
over the two pooled samples, or present in only one sample, there is no intertemporal 
change, and so prices are assumed to be constant and equal to 1. Therefore, we write 
the QUAIDS model as: 
(3 .1 0) 
3.5 Equivalence Scales 
Data on household expenditure is "widely acknowledged to provide superior quality 
data and a rich source of information on household behaviour and welfare" 17. However, 
when using household level data rather than personal unit record data, the impact on the 
behaviour of the household composition must be taken into account. This is particularly 
relevant when the heterogeneity of family and household structures in Australia is 
considered. The differing needs of adults and children influence the expenditure of the 
household, and this influence is captured in estimation by the use of an equivalence 
scale. 
Equivalence scales offer a means to assess what expenditure different household 
compositions must have in order to achieve the same level of welfare as the reference 
household. The Engel and Rothbarth models are not derived directly from utility theory 
17 Lancaster, Ray and Valenzuela (1997), pg 1. 
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and rely on stringent assumptions regarding the link between adult welfare and 
behaviour. The Engel (1895) model is derived from the theory that the welfare of 
households is inversely related to the household budget share of food. The Rothbarth 
(1943) scale is derived from the ratio of aggregate expenditures of demographically 
different households that maintain constant expenditure on defined 'adult goods'. 
Barten (1964) introduced estimation of equivalence scales from systems of demand 
functions that satisfy the 'adding up' constraint. Blacklow ( 1997) 18 estimated 
equivalence scales using the QUAIDS model for the data which is used in this analysis. 
Hence the Blacklow (1997) estimates of equivalence scales for Australian household 
expenditure data are used in the estimation, although an average across categories of the 
different age and sex categories of dependents in the household is used. 
3.5.1 Equivalence Scale Model 
The functional form of the model is the QUAIDS model with constant prices can be 
expanded to incorporate equivalence scales as follows: 
(3.11) 
where: m0 = (1 + KK +¢A)/zAP ; K =number of children in the household; (3.12) 
and; A = number of adults in the household. 
18 University of Tasmania Ph. D. dissertation, yet to be released. In contrast to the Engel and 
Rothbarth scales, accommodation expenses were included yielding a different result for the equivalence 
scale estimation which was found to be significant. 
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Following the Engel method, the scale is normalised at unity for a reference household, 
which is assumed to be a childless couple in this paper. 
3.6 Estimation Issues 
Demand systems are estimated using Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE). The 
adding up property of demand systems ensures that the sum of the disturbance terms 
over each equation within the system will equal zero for each time period. Denoting the 
vector of disturbance terms for each time period as Vt, it follows that the matrix of 
disturbance terms: 
(3.13) 
Omitting the final element of Vt, and denoting the resulting sub-vector as v /, and 
assummg v t n to be identically and independently distributed, permits the likelihood 
function to be written as: 
(3 .14) 
Heteroskedasticity is tested for and corrected within ShazamE by usmg the HET 
command, which uses an information inverse matrix. 
19 For a full explanation of the likelihood function see Barten (1969). 
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4.1 Estimation 
The first issue is whether the demand system being tested has quadratic Engel curves. 
This is determined by a likelihood ratio test based on the log-likelihood function value 
estimated for the linear and quadratic functions individually. The function is1: 
(4.1) 
where: L(H1) = log-likelihood value of quadratic system; 
L(Ho) =log-likelihood value oflinear (restricted) system. 
Given that the null hypothesis is true, ALR has an approximate chi-square distribution 
where the number of restrictions gives the degrees of freedom, J. If the function is 
statistically significant the null hypothesis of linearity is rejected. 
The resulting lv term was significant for both the income and expenditure QUAIDS 
models, indicating that both functions had non-linear Engel curves. 2 This result is 
consistent with the previously mentioned results obtained using US and UK household 
expenditure data, and with the Jones and Mazzi (1996) application of the QUAIDS 
model to tobacco consumption and taxation in Italy. Estimation including the 
demographic characteristics is thus conducted using the quadratic expenditure model. 
1 See Griffiths, Hill and Judge (1993), pg. 455 for a further explanation of the test. 
2 The income system was used in order to obtain the income elasticities of the budget shares of the 
three gaming categories. The approach to estimating the system is explained in Section 4.4. 
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4.2 The Econometric Model 
The expenditure demographic model tested may be written: 
W 1 = a1 + a1r(sex) + a,s(sur) + a;t(emp) + a1u(year) + a1v(cob) 
+ a1w(age) + A[m- a0 ] + lf/1[m- a 0 ] 2 ; 
where: m is the logarithm of equivalent expenditure; and 
ao is a measure of subsistence expenditure3 \7' i 1, 7. 
Chapter 4 
(4.2) 
One equation is the budget share of insurance which is a risk-averse expenditure as 
opposed to the risk-loving gaming budget shares. 
Due to memory capacity problems the system was estimated iteratively, with each new 
demographic variable being included after the previous restricted system had converged. 
Piecewise regression can give biased results and so the likelihood ratio test was used in 
each instance to determine the joint significance or otherwise of the new variable. The 
results of the likelihood tests are given table A4.1 in Appendix 4. 
4.3 Results of the Demographic Demand System 
The results of estimation of equation 4.2 are contained in Table 4.1. Previous studies 
provide expectations regarding the direction of some of the regressors. For example, 
Scott and Garen (1994) and Clotfelter and Cook (1987) found that lottery ticket sales 
were positively related to unemployment levels. The results given in Table 4.1 indicate 
that this is not the case for any of the three gaming categories estimated. The negative 
3 For a further explanation of the ao term see Deaton and Muellbauer (1980) or Lewbel (1995). 
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coefficients on the unemployment term in all three gaming equations indicate that net 
gaming expenditure, as a budget share, falls as the rate of unemployment rises. 
Determinants of Household Gaming Expenditure 
Gaming - Type A Gaming - Type B Gaming - Type C 
Variable 
subsistence 4.49900 4.49900 4.49900 
expenditure 
std error (0.46090) (0.46090) (0.46090) 
t-ratio 9.762* 9.762* 9.762* 
constant 0.0348370 0.0086088 -0.00260 
std error (0.00776) (0.00475) (0.00451) 
!-ratio 4.485* 1.812* -0.577 
linear term -0.0073424 -0.0024174 0.0016106 
std error (0.00228) (0.00151) (0.00144) 
t-ratio -3.211 * -1.609 1.118 
quadratic term 0.0002996 0.0001942 -0.0001698 
std error (0.00019) (0.00012) (0.00012) 
!-ratio 1.605 1.582 -1.448 
sex 0.0030844 0.0001122 0.0006368 
std error (0.00039) (0.00025) (0.00024) 
!-ratio 7.996* 0.442 2.630* 
sur -0.0257740 -0.0095162 -0.0078409 
std error (0.01616) (0.01063) (0.01013) 
t-ratio -1.595 -0.895 -0.774 
employment 0.0005128 -0.0000603 0.0000987 
std error (0.00031) (0.00021) (0.00020) 
!-ratio 1.645* -0.294 0.503 
year (1993) 0.0028272 0.0011492 0.0006251 
std error (0.00054) (0.00036) (0.00034) 
t-ratio 5.269* 3.258* 1.858* 
country of birth 0.0004490 -0.0001127 0.0002910 
std error (0.00039) (0.00025) (0.00024) 
t-ratio 1.162 -0.444 1.200 
age 0.0001112 0.0000170 0.0000265 
std error (0.0000114) (0.0000075) (0.0000072) 
t-ratio 9.731 * 2.267* 3.702* 
Note: * indicates significance at the a= 0.05 level of significance. 
This result is supported by the positive coefficient of employment status for ga and gc, 
although this may capture a retirement effect. However, poker machines, gb, indicate 
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expenditure increasing with a shift out of the labour force, although this is not 
statistically significant. 
The coefficients of the constant, linear and quadratic terms for each gaming type suggest 
that lottery type games and poker machines have a bounded minimum budget share, 
while casino style games have a bounded maximum budget share. This could possibly 
be due to the habitual purchase of lottery tickets, compared to the more infrequent visits 
to a casino, or playing of similar style games. 
Gaming expenditure as a budget share significantly increases with the age of the 
gambler, in all three categories of gaming, as found by Kitchen and Powells (1991) for 
Canada. This poses equity considerations for policy makers, since retired people and 
pensioners generally have a lower income than during their working life. Hence, gaming 
may be regressive across age as well as income categories. A method of testing this 
could be to include a quadratic age term, in an attempt to capture the income-age effect, 
similar to Scott and Garen (1994), or the use of a retirement dummy variable. 
Male headed households have a higher net gaming expenditure than households with 
female heads. This is in line with the results found by Worthington ( 1997) and the 
North American literature. 4 While this is significant for casino and lottery style games 
(ga and gb) the coefficient for poker machine expenditure is very small and statistically 
not significant. Individual level data may provide better results regarding the influence 
of gender on gaming behaviour. 
4 For example, Clotfelter and Cook (1987) USA, and Kitchen and Powells (1991) Canada. 
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Although not individually significant, the null hypothesis of joint insignificance of ethnic 
background across gaming commodities is rejected. Migrants game less than do native 
born Australians, except on poker machines. This result agrees with the evidence found 
by Worthington ( 1997). 
The proxy variable for accessibility, real per capita gaming expenditure, was tested 
independently and found to be statistically significant in all cases. The variable was 
tested independently due to memory capacity problems causing non-convergence. 
The inclusion of the dummy variable for 1993 shows that the budget share of all three 
gaming categories has significantly grown over the period. The strongest growth is in 
lottery expenditure. 
Effect of Year on Non-Gaming Budget Shares 
Budget Share Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio 
Food 0.07401 0.0044 16.805* 
Alcohol and Tobacco 0.00918 0.0023 3.986* 
Entertainment -0.01775 0.0106 -1.671* 
Others -0.08555 0.0117 -7.3074* 
Insurance 0.00747 0.0016 4.6276* 
Note: * signifies significance at the a= 0. 05 level of significance. 
Table 4.2 indicates that this increase in expenditure comes from a substitution away 
from other entertainment and weekly household expenditure on 'other' goods, 
including consumer durables. The budget share of insurance has significantly grown 
over the same period, indicating further gaming expenditure is increasing among 
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participants, rather than a general fall in the average risk-aversion level of the sample, 
as is suggested by the percentage of participants in the sample falling as outlined m 
Chapter 1. 
4.4 Regressivity of Australian Gaming Taxes 
The absolute regressivity or progressivity of taxes on gaming can be determined using 
the income elasticity of the income share of gaming. The closer to zero is the income 
elasticity of the budget share of a product, the higher is the degree of necessity. Hence, 
taxes on such products will be more regressive. From the quadratic income modee, the 
income share of a gaming product may be defined as: 
gi = a; + /3; logi +If/; [logi r; (4.3) 
which, since gi = a; + /3; logi +If/; [logi r; 
=> Sg; /. = g; ( + a + 2w logi · /5i li 1-'i y· l ' 
;g1 = Jg ~ [Ji; J; elasticity of budget share of gaming; 
=> (4.4) 
5 The income system was estimated using an equivalence scale derived from estimating the income-
weighted savings gap (ie. equivalent total household income minus expenditure, which is defined as the 
sum of household expenditures forming the dependent variables in the expenditure system). This, in 
effect, assumes that the income equivalence scale used is a weighted function of the expenditure 
equivalence scale estimated by Blacklow (1997). 
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Using this measure: if ~g; < 0 then the good is inferior; 
if 0 < ~g; < 1 then the good is a necessity, and a tax will be 
regressive; 
if ~g; > 1 then the good is a luxury, and a tax will be progressive. 
Results of the elasticites of the income share of the three categories of gaming products 
analysed may be seen in Table 4.3 below. The monotonically decreasing budget share of 
ga and gb suggest regressivity and this is confirmed by the estimated income elasticity of 
the budget share of gaming. From Table 4.3 it can be seen that income elasticity 
increases with income quintile for ga and gb. For more detail on income quintile and 
expenditure on gaming products see table A4.2 in Appendix 4. 
Quintile average Income Income Income 
equivalent income elasticity of elasticity of elasticity of 
9a 9b 9c 
Lower quintile 16399.577 0.058899 0.230854 0.196091 
Second quintile 31633.367 0.113415 0.32036 0.309945 
Central quintile 47028.292 0.161808 0.577845 1.190328 
Fourth quintile 73997.436 0.24111 0.853938 0.899933 
Upper quintile 144733.578 0.490406 1.496368 -3.453929 
The results of estimating the income elasticities of each type of gaming indicate that 
taxes on lottery products are regressive across all income categories, while poker 
machines taxes are regressive in all but the highest income quintile. Taxes on casino and 
casino type games are regressive in all but the central income quintile, but this result 
must be challenged due to the net negative expenditure (net winnings) of gamblers in the 
uppermost income quintile. 
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These results accord very well with the theoretical model of gaming behaviour 
developed in Chapter 2. Excise taxes on gaming products have the potential to be 
particularly regressive for lower socio-economic groups, similar to those on tobacco and 
alcohol, which, along with gambling, are classed as 'sin goods' .6 
6 For tobacco tax regressivity in Italy see Jones and Mazzi (1996). See Jones (1989) for an analysis of 
the demand for alcohol and tobacco using maximum likelihood estimation. 
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5.1 Summary of Results 
The results presented in Chapter 4 suggest that State governments should be aware of 
the regressive nature of most gaming products. The type of expansion of the industry 
that is currently occurring, such as metropolitan casinos and suburban poker machine 
and keno facilities, appear to present a possible strongly negative welfare effect. 
Demographic variables such as age, gender, and employment status have significant 
effects on gaming expenditure. This presents an opportunity for State governments to 
target further gaming facilities at those groups least subject to the regressive nature of 
gaming taxation. 
5.2 Limitations and Further Research 
This research contains some limitations which are worth discussing. Firstly, gaming is a 
growth industry in Australia in the 1990's, but due to the lack of availability of current 
data, this trend is not fully captured in the estimation process. In particular, the opening 
of three casinos in Queensland as well as the Sydney Harbour Casino and Crown Casino 
in Melbourne could influence the results markedly. New data would also allow for the 
use of an individual category of casino gaming expenditure, and this suggested as one 
area where further research could be undertaken. 
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A further limitation of the data was the lack of prices for gaming, allowing no price 
variation effects. If a price measure could be constructed for the different forms of 
gaming, as is done by Walker et al ( 1996), a Social Welfare Function could be 
constructed 1 which would give a better understanding of the welfare effects of gaming 
taxes and changes in the tax rates. This research offers the general statement that gaming 
taxes are regressive, but without comparison with the regressivity of taxes on other 
commodities, the tax system is not evaluated as becoming more or less regressive with 
the expansion in gaming facilities. 
The inclusion of different demographic variables is another means to extend the research 
in this field. Education levels and occupation may offer a further insight into what 
influences people to participate in gaming, and a more robust measure of accessibility 
could be constructed. Accessibility is a key criteria to gaming behaviour, and some 
formal measure of the relative ease of access to different gaming facilities could enhance 
not only the empirical aspect of gaming research, but the theoretical structure. The use 
of real per capita gaming expenditure as a proxy for accessibility does not accurately 
capture the influence of easy access to gaming facilities on the budget share of gaming 
expenditure, especially given the marked difference in the availability of gaming products 
between urban and rural centres. 
The treatment of zeros in the data set as zero expenditure rather than non-participation 
offers a chance to extend demand system analysis of gaming in Australia using the 
Tobit approach of Worthington (1997) and Scott and Garen (1994). Distinguishing 
1 Similar to that used in Jones and Mazzi (1996). 
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between non-participants and those who 'broke even' offers a method of including the 
net winners in the estimation, as well as a determination of whether the change in 
gaming expenditure resulting from increased expenditure by participants or an increase 
in participation rates. 
5.3 Conclusion 
The exploratory nature of this paper placed many potential improvements to the work 
outside the scope of this research. Additional data and computing power limitations 
restricted the number and degree of sophistication of the demographic variables used. 
The next HES survey and the use of more advanced computing facilities offer the 
chance to extend the current research into gaming behaviour and the regressive, or 
otherwise, nature of gaming taxes in Australia. 
It is hoped that State governments will take some note of the potential widening of the 
income gap that may occur if heavy reliance on gaming receipts as State own-source 
revenue continue. In addition it is hoped that the results presented in this analysis may 
provide useful policy guidelines when further expansions of the Australian gaming 
industry are planned. 
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Appendix 1 
The Popularity of Gaming Activities in Australia 
1984 
1993 
gl 
g2 
g3 
g4 
g5 
g1 
11.82 
8.62 
= 
= 
= 
Gaming Participation Rates (%) 
g2 g3 g4 g5 gtotal 
47.46 6.77 0.267 28.76 61.15 
43.28 8.55 0.871 21.44 55.97 
Lottery tickets + soccer pools. 
Lotto (inc. Tattslotto) + instant lotteries eg. scratch and win. 
Poker machines and other electronic gaming machines. 
Casino gaming (in Tasmania this includes poker machines). 
Minor gaming such as bingo, keno etc. 
Comparison of Racing and Gaming Activity in Australia 
I. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ............................................... ·.·.·.· .............. ·~ni ni· . . . . . •. . • . T .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .··' .•  ..• ' .•  ..• '.•  ..• ' ,• ..• ' .•  ..• '.• •.:'··:• ... ' ... • ... '· ..• '.. ·' ... • ..• '..•  ..• '..•  ..• ':':· ..• ' .•  ... '..•  ..• '..•  ..• '.• •.':··.,:.·.·,: .. • .. ,·· ..  .• ·.· ..•  ..• '..•  ... '... • ..• '..•  ..• '..•  ..• ' ·.':.:':':····.:.: ..· :·.·.:.··,'·.• .. :':·:.· .• ·.' .. :•· ..'::::·:'·.:• .• ·.• ··.'·.•·.'·.·:':'·.'·.•··.•·.··:•.· ••· ···.····:·.•·.··••:··' ..! • . : ··· · · ,:•.wi~~~~~;~it~e~ni?i.tt#d1P.&~rP.&oo¢wr:: ::::. : ·····-
Total Real Racing Turnover $m 
Year NSW Victoria Qld SA WA Tasmania ACT NT 
1984-85 5045.486 3370.255 1862.596 845.532 911.28 222.213 130.059 105.093 
1985-86 5308.143 3549.399 1935.736 839.981 856.311 228.374 154.427 80.949 
1986-87 530.074 3498.574 1762.896 732.522 807.953 213.957 151.323 81.841 
1987-88 5358.535 3545.007 1770.794 766.16 846.253 229.532 156.601 80.443 
1988-89 5778.198 3519.967 1850.373 793.536 868.945 235.287 150.845 76.604 
1989-90 5693.939 3423.423 1838.717 814.397 864.149 250.664 152.584 81.581 
1990-91 5566.34 3257.668 1801.92 786.436 770.641 245.919 146.625 93.778 
1991-92 5306.153 3198.982 1786.355 738.558 707.734 255.753 136.978 90.32 
1992-93 5006.553 3164.08 1822.882 725.899 769.043 269.037 136.472 106.165 
1993-94 4870.44 3167.403 1898.584 790.949 860.57 282.297 135.371 132.675 
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Total Real Gaming Turnover $m 
Year NSW Victoria Qld SA WA Tasmania ACT NT 
1984-85 10517.96 1076.928 455.854 273.305 189.96 311.339 372.762 176.108 
1985-86 10275.66 997.000 745.785 502.186 421.278 301.467 376.791 193.997 
1986-87 10538.06 1021.564 985.409 662.618 720.946 283.658 357.709 276.207 
1987-88 10882.88 1064.463 1188.622 710.429 773.241 311.674 440.297 275.449 
1988-89 12770.67 1039.929 1334.321 890.961 1021.519 339.355 542.665 419.79 
1989-90 13912.92 1150.114 1442.884 1020.192 1226.963 335.982 589.03 824.452 
1990-91 14192.11 1230.450 1713.234 854.228 1409.696 340.906 623.868 405.881 
1991-92 15061.87 4081.315 2039.04 888.754 1456.238 359.066 726.929 424.156 
1992-93 16449.35 1484.103 3612.435 888.436 1747.207 357.297 823.501 347.67 
1993-94 21436.7 8823.537 4523.197 885.255 2182.93 962.737 1056.635 376.755 
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Derivation of the Variance of X 
Var(XJ = E(X/ - E(Xi 
Evidence From Psychological Trials 
Studies indicate that the percentage of risk-aversion (%RA) increases with the size of 
the prospect G. G-values are in dollars throughout. 
Hershey, Kunreuther and Shoemaker (1982) found that for a sample of subjects, and 
for p = 0.5 For G = 200, %RA = 58; (n = 66) 
For G = 1 000 %RA = 77· (n = 69) 
' ' ' 
For G = 2,000, %RA = 86; (n =72) 
For G = 10 000 o/cRA = 95· (n=74)· 
' ' 0 ' ' 
for p = 0.1 For G = 100, %RA = 23; (n = 82) 
For G = 200, %RA = 47; (n = 201) 
For G = 10,000, %RA = 70; (n = 82); and 
for p = 0.01 For G = 100, %RA = 16; (n = 82) 
For G = 1,000, %RA = 35; (n = 82) 
For G = 10,000, %RA = 60; (n = 82) 
For G = 100,000, %RA = 70; (n = 82) 
For G = 1,000,000, %RA = 81; (n = 82). 
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Battalio, Kagen and Komain (1990) report supporting results over a sample of35, and 
forp=0.5: ForG= 10, %RA=40, 
For G = 20, %RA = 57. 
Proof of the Small Gamble Theorem. 
Assume the Fair Prospect Model (FPM) holds for any given P(G) = p. 
Assume p (skewness of the prospect) fixed, and that G (size of the gamble) varies. 
If & is small, the individual will accept small prospects and reject large prospects. 
Consider prospect (G,p) for any 0 < p < I: 
If & s; [U(K)- pU(Kip)]l V[K(J-p)lp}; (1) 
then three statements hold: 
1) 3 some critical postive value of G, c(K), dependent on K, such that 
E(G,p,K) > U(K) iff 0 < G < c(K); 
2) 3 some uniquely preferred positive prospect size, m(K), within the set of 
acceptable prospects, such that 0 < m(K) < c(K) and such that G = m(K) uniquely 
maximises E(G,p,K) with respect to G; and 
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3) If the utility ofwealth function U(W) exhibits decling risk-aversion, then the 
range of acceptable prospects and the size of the uniquely preferred prospect increase 
with initial wealth, K: 
Formally: IfU'"> 0, thenA '(K) andB'(K) > 0. 
Proof of Statements (1) and (2): 
Define bet benefit of a gamble of size,G, and initial wealth position, K,as: 
b(G,K) = E(G,pK) - U(K) 
. ·. b(G,K) = pU(K+G) + (1-p)U[K-pG(J-pfj + eV(G,p)- U(K) 
We can obtain the following first order conditions: 
. ·. bJ(G,K) = pU'(K +G)- pU'[K-pG(J-p)"1] + eV(G,p); 
. ·. b2(G,K) = pU'(K+G) + (1-p)U'[K-pG(J-plJ- U'(K);. 
and we can obtain the following second-order conditions: 
. ·. bu(G,K) pU"(K +G) + p 2(I-pl U"[K-pG(I-p)"1] + eVn(G,p) 
. ·. b12(G,K) = pU"(K +G)- pU"[K-pG(J-p)"1}. 
w.r.t. G 
w.r.t. K 
From these conditions and the assumptions of the FPM we can infer: 
b(O,K) = 0; 
bi(O,K) = e1V(O,p),· 
bu(G,K) < 0; and 
b[K(J-p)lp,K] = (e-e*)V[K(J-p)lp,p]; 
where e* = RHS of(l). 
(a) 
(b) 
(c) 
(d) 
Appendix 2 
From above (a) shows that b(G,K) passes through the origin; (b) shows that the 
direction is into the first quadrant; (c) shows that there will be some unique maximum of 
b(G,K) w.r.t. G within the range of acceptable prospects iff in (d) s* >&,as in the graph 
in section 2.2.3. 
Proof of Statement (3): 
Recall U'" > 0 and the assumptions ofthe FPM in order to obtain: 
bi[c(K),K} < 0; 
b n{G,K) = b2i{G,K) > 0; 
b2(0,K) = 0; and 
b2(G,K) > 0; \7' G. 
(e) 
(f) 
(g) 
(h) 
The b(G)-maximising value m(K) is implicitly defined by the first-order condition: 
bi[m(K),K] = 0; and 
the intercept value c(K) is implicitly defined by: 
b[c(K),K} = 0. 
Implicit differentiation of these yield the following first-order conditions: 
m '(K) = -b12[m(K),K]/bn[m(K),K]; and 
c '(K) = -b2{c(K),K]Ibi[c(K),K]; and 
(c), (e), (f) and (h) show that both derivatives are positive. 
Proof of the Lottery Theorem. 
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Assume FPM: 
If e is not too small, then for any G, an individual will accept a prospect if p is small 
enough. 
Formally: 
e> GU'(K)IV2(G,O); VG > 0; 
then, V G > 0, 3 a positive constant D, such that E(G,pK) > U(K) V 0 < p < D. 
Defining the net benfit of the prospect as: 
b(p) =E(G,p,K)- U(K); which is now a function of p; 
b(p) = pU(K+G) + (1-p)U[K-pG(J-p)-1 + eV(G,p)- U(K); 
.·.b'(p) = U(K+G)- U[K-pG(1-p)-1]- G(J-p)-1U'[K-pG(J-p)-1] + eV2(G,p); 
. ·.at p = 0 and V(G,O) = 0; b(O) = 0; and 
b'(O) = U(K+G)- U(K)- GU'(K) + eVJ(G,O); 
> -GU'(K) + eV2(G, 0) 
= V2(G,O)[e- GU'(K)IV2(G,O)]. 
Proof of the Unfair Prospect Model. 
The expected utility function is defined as in the FPM. An individual will prefer a risky 
prospect (G,L,p) to a corresponding sure payments =pG- (1-p)L: 
iff: E(G-S,p,K+S) > U(K +S). 
Specialising to the instance where L = 0 => S = pG and defining the net benefit of the 
unfair prospect over the sure payment as: 
b(G) = E(G-S,p,K+S) - U(K+S); 
b(G) =pU(K+G) + (1-p)U(K) + eV[(J-p)G,p]- U(K+pG). 
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The object is to show that this model has the same shape as the FPM, for some constant 
C, which will make the risky prospect preferable to the sure payment iff 0 < G < C. 
In order to prove this, assume: 
s < (1-p)[Uco- U(K)]!Vco; and 
b(G) = 0 has at most one positive solution for G. 
From these assumptions we attain: 
b(O) = 0, b'(O) = &(1-p)VI(O,p) > 0; and 
b(w) = sV(oo,p)- (1-p)[Uw- U(K)] < 0. 
And thus, the UPM has the same shape as the FPM as illustrated in section 2.2.3. 
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Dependent Variables 
Dependent variables are a (8x 1) vector of household expenditures on certain goods in 
the sample week expressed as budget shares: 
ga 
gb 
gc 
= 
= 
food = 
alctob 
ent 
other 
ms 
Lottery tickets + soccer pools + Lotto (inc. Tattslotto) + instant 
lotteries eg. scratch and win. 
Poker machines and other electronic gaming machines. 
Casino gaming (in Tasmania this includes poker machines) 
+ Minor gaming such as bingo, keno etc. 
Food+ non-alcoholic beverages. 
Alcohol+ tobacco. 
Entertainment and recreation- (ga + gb + gc). 
all other household weekly expenditure. (Default variable). 
Household expenditure on insurance: included separately due to 
risk-averse nature of insurance as opposed to risk-loving nature 
of gaming. 
Independent Variables 
Independent variables form a (1xl 0) vector of socioeconomic and demographic 
characteristics of the households in the survey week: 
sex* 
sur** = 
Gender of the household head - 0 for female, 1 for male. 
State unemployment rate, used as a proxy for the general level 
of aggregate economic activity in each State. 
eqs = 
age 
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Real per capita gaming expenditure for each State: included as 
a proxy for relative accessibility of each type of gaming. 
Equivalence scale determined from the family composition of 
the household and number of dependents in the household. 
Age of the household head - continuous variable composed of 
the class-mark of 5 year age categories above 20. 
cob* Country ofbirth of the household head- 0 for Australia and other 
oceania, 1 for others (migrants). Note New Zealanders are not 
classified as migrants due to legal status in Australia. 
emp* Employment status of the household head- 0 for unemployed or 
not in the labour force, 1 for wage and salary earners (part and 
full time) and self-employed. 
year* Indicates year of sample - 0 for 1984, 1 for 1993. 
a 0 Coefficient indicating the level of subsistence expenditure. 
ai Constant term in each budget share equation. 
~i Linear term of equivalent expenditure in each budget share 
equation. 
Quadratic term of equivalent expenditure in each budget share 
equation. 
Note: * indicates a categorical variable which is proxied by dummy variables for each 
category. 
** indicates a proxy variable for a difficult to measure factor. 
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Unemployment 
State unemployment rates were obtained from the ABS State Yearbooks. Since these 
figures were not available for Northern Territory and the Australian Capital Territory 
they were assigned the national average for the year. 
State Unemployment Rate (%) 
NSW Vic Qld SA WA Tas NT ACT 
1984 8.9 7 9.2 10.8 8.9 10.5 8.9 8.9 
1993 10.4 12.4 10.3 11.7 9.7 12.3 10.8 10.8 
Real per Capita Gaming Expenditure 
Real per capita gaming expenditure statistics were obtained from the Tasmanian Gaming 
Commission and CREA Gambling Statistics 1972-73 to 1995-96 and since these were in 
1995 $A they were deflated using the CPI Indicator provided to 1988 $A in order to 
match the HES data. 
Real Per Capita Gaming Expenditure By State and Type 
NSW Vic Qld SA WA Tas NT ACT 
g1 1984 10.59 3 18.12 5.65 9.38 7.32 6.45 4.45 
1993 9.89 1.81 2.92 0.81 1.44 1.65 6.22 4.4 
' 
g2 1984 56.34 89.48 66.78 45.19 53.66 68.73 47.88 55.72 
1993 47.66 74.12 79.5 57.24 107.53 64.99 70.9 50.97 
g3 1984 247.87 0 0 0 0 0* 0 192.86 
~I 
1993 362.5 170.17 121.05 0 0 0* 25.48 373.36 
g4 1984 0 0 0 0 0 102.69 173.89 0 
1993 0 0 82.33 87.97 239.75 133.48 244.37 129.67 
g5 1984 0 24.94 0 45.75 0 30.82 7.5 N/A 
1993 11.6 29.27 35.97** 48.77 15.79 21.98 N/A N/A 
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* included in casino expenditure since all poker machines were in casino until 1996. 
* * indicates one figure included in this category is not available. 
N/ A means figures not available. Assigned an expenditure value of zero in the data. 
Note: zero indicates no access to type of gaming in State. 
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The demand system was estimated iteratively, with new variables being included after 
the previous restricted system had converged. In order to determine the joint 
significance of the coefficients of the newly included variable the log-likelihood values 
were used at each stage to conduct a likelihood ratio test as explained in Section 4.1. 
Table A4.1 shows that each included variable proved to be jointly significant. 
likelihood Ratio Test of Significance Results 
Log-likelihood Value Test Value 
Variable 
Linear (~) 3519.5 
Quadratic (z) 3549.7 60.4 
Gender* 137645.8 268192.2 
State Unemployment Rate 138811.7 2331.8 
Employment Status* 139397.6 1171.8 
Year* 139550.3 305.4 
Country of Birth* 139598.9 97.2 
Age* 139871.5 545.2 
Note: * signifies a dummy variable. 
Income Elasticities of the Budget Share of Gaming 
The income elasticity of the budget share of gaming products is used as a measure of the 
regressivity of gaming taxes. Table A4.2 below shows these elasticities. 
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Participant's Income Income Quintile 
average share of ga elasticity of average 
expenditure ga equivalent 
on ga income 
Lower quintile 486.2079927 0.02964759 0.0588991018 16399.57661 
Second quintile 553.5189769 0.01749795 0.1134149163 31633.36694 
Central quintile 618.6831149 0.01315555 0.1618078363 47028.29223 
Fourth quintile 703.9054653 0.00951257 0.2411 098499 73997.43561 
Upper quintile 748.9628733 0.00517477 0.4904057487 144733.5784 
Participant's Income Income Quintile 
average share of gb elasticity of average 
expenditure gb equivalent 
on gb income 
Lower quintile 505.5137615 0.03082481 0.230853708 16399.57661 
Second quintile 794. 1202532 0.02510388 0.320359721 31633.36694 
Central quintile 699.4753363 0.0148735 0.577844923 47028.29223 
Fourth quintile 800.1277533 0.01081291 0.853937395 73997.43561 
Upper quintile 984.7631579 0.00680397 1.496367547 144733.5784 
Participant's Income Income Quintile 
average share of gc elasticity of average 
expenditure gc equivalent 
on gc income 
Lower quintile 298.6543689 0.0182111 0.196091041 16399.57661 
Second quintile 414.0294118 0.01308838 0.309944579 31633.36694 
Central quintile 171.6041379 0.00364896 1.190327772 47028.29223 
Fourth quintile 385.112782 0.00520441 0.899933118 73997.43561 
Upper quintile -216.981763 -0.0014992 -3.453929424* 144733.5784 
Note: * indicates a spurious result which should be given little credence due to an 
average negative net expenditure on gc for the wealthiest quintile. That is, this quintile 
are net winners when playing casino type games. 
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